THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION, *16*(3), 209–223
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RESEARCH

Catholic Guilt? Comparing Catholics' and Protestants' Religious Motivations

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Are Catholics more motivated by guilt than Protestants? I tested this hypothesis via self-determination theory's concept of *introjected motivation*, in which behavior is only partially internalized (Deci & Ryan, 1991). Study 1 found that 1409 Catholic undergraduates were higher in introjected motivation than 1261 Protestant undergraduates. Catholics were also lower in identified motivation, in which behavior is fully internalized. Similarly, Study 2 found that a Catholic community sample was higher in introjected motivation than a Unitarian sample, and higher in external motivation (in which behavior is not at all internalized) than both the Unitarian and a Baptist sample. However, Study 2 Catholics were higher than the Unitarian sample in identified motivation, and the three groups were equal in intrinsic motivation (in which behavior is also fully internalized). Furthermore, the different groups were essentially equal in subjective well-being. Thus, although Catholicism may present motivational challenges to its adherents, these challenges do not necessarily undermine intrinsic motivation and well-being.

Most of us are familiar with the "Catholic guilt" stereotype (Tangney & Dearing, 2002). The Catholic religion is perhaps unique among world religions in its emphasis on remorse, confession, and atonement, and in its emphasis on "rigid hierarchy and many required practices" (Demaria & Kassinove, 1988; Hutchinson, Patock-Peckham, Cheong, & Nagoshi, 1998). Thus, William James, in *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902/1985), described Catholicism as "too legalistic and moralistic" (p. 102). Perhaps as a result, Catholics have been described as

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suffering from "powerful superego guilt" (Hailparn & Hailparn, 1994), as viewing their religion as more punitive and demanding than the Protestant religion (Hutchinson et al., 1998), and as practicing their religion in part as a defense against internal conflict (Maddi & Rulla, 1972).

Some past research in the psychology of religion supports these stereotypes. Celmer and Winer (1990) found that a sample of Catholic priests were higher than a comparison sample of nonpriests in the MMPI scales of hypochondria, depression, and hysteria. Similarly, in a large-sample study MacDonald and Luckett (1983) found that Catholic inpatients were higher in hysteria and obsessive–compulsive disorders than Protestant inpatients. Demaria and Kassinove (1988) found that a sample of Catholics was higher in guilt over self-control failure than a sample of Protestants. Park, Cohen, and Herb (1990) found that intrinsically religious Catholics made more use of guilt-based coping than intrinsically religious Protestants. Hjelle and Aboud (1970) found that highly committed Catholics (relative to less committed Catholics) were higher in the Murrayian need for abasement and lower on the Murrayian need for autonomy, a pattern of findings that was replicated by Coates (1973).

However, much of this research is dated, and only peripherally addresses the central issue of guilt motivation. In addition, much of this research is lacking in explicit theoretical grounding, thus lacking firm bases for predictions. Accordingly, in this research I addressed the issue through the lens of self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1991, 2000). SDT is a comprehensive theory of human motivation that makes strong claims about the most optimal or "healthy" forms of motivation. Relevant aspects of the theory are summarized next.

SDT began with the concept of intrinsic motivation, which is the desire to perform an activity because it is inherently interesting and enjoyable, rather than to obtain some separable reward (Deci, 1972). Much early research demonstrated that external rewards, incentives, and deadline pressures can undermine intrinsic motivation. This undermining was shown to occur because rewards, incentives, and pressures are often delivered in controlling ways, thwarting participants' need for autonomy and "spoiling" the experience (see Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999, or Deci & Ryan, 1985, for reviews). Central to the intrinsic motivation undermining phenomenon is participants' *cognitive evaluations* of the social meaning of rewards: Are they meant to convey competence information, or are they meant to control (Deci & Ryan, 1985)? Peoples' cognitive evaluations are influenced both by their personality styles and by the nature of the social context (Deci & Ryan, 1991).

Of course, intrinsic motivation is not the only important type of motivation. Acknowledging this, SDT was later expanded to encompass four basic types of motivation: external motivation (acting to get tangible rewards or to avoid social disapproval), introjected motivation (acting to avoid negative self-feelings), identified motivation (acting to express important self-commitments), and intrinsic motiva-

tion (acting because of the enjoyment inherent in doing the activity; Ryan & Connell, 1989). These four motivations have been located on a continuum of internalization, ranging from no internalization (external motivation) to partial internalization (introjected motivation) to full internalization (identified motivation) to automatic internalization (intrinsic motivation). Considerable research has supported the validity of the motivation continuum (Sheldon, 2005), as well as showing that internalized motivations (i.e., identified and intrinsic motivations) predict greater task persistence, performance, creativity, and psychological well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Sheldon, 2004), whereas noninternalized motivations (i.e., external and introjected motivations) tend to be problematic for adjustment and performance.

In this research, I reasoned that the concept of introjection might be particularly relevant for understanding the differing religious motivations of Catholics and Protestants. Introjected motivation is primarily about guilt: one part of the person is forcing another part of the person to act to avoid negative self-feelings (Ryan, 1982). Because introjected motivations are only partially internalized into the person's integrated sense of self, such motivations are often accompanied by unhealthy ego involvements and unmastered internal pressures (Crocker & Park, 2004; Deci & Ryan, 2000). Thus, introjected motivations can give rise to behavior about which the person is deeply ambivalent and conflicted. Obviously, these characterizations are at least superficially consistent with the stereotypes and research concerning Catholicism cited previously. Thus, my starting hypothesis was that Catholics would be higher in introjection than Protestants.

In addition, I hypothesized that Catholics would be lower on religious identification than Protestants. The process of identification is an important means by which people internalize originally externally imposed motivations (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000). For example, a young girl who shares with others only because "mommy makes her" will hopefully become a young adult who shares because she identifies her sense of self with the value of sharing. Internalization is promoted when motivating authorities are autonomy-supportive rather than controlling (i.e., when they encourage their charges to make their own free choices rather than trying to force or "guilt" them in behavior; Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, 1994; Grolnick, 2003). If Catholic religious authorities and traditions indeed give greater emphasis to guilt (and its amelioration via confession; Hailparn & Hailparn, 1994), and if Catholic social and power structures really are more rigid and hierarchical (Demaria & Kassinove, 1988), then this may prevent Catholics from fully internalizing or identifying with their own religious practices.

Notably, it may be somewhat difficult to compare Protestants and Catholics (Stark & Glock, 1968), in part because of significant differences between different Protestant sects. In other words, the large variations within the Protestant category, as well as likely variations among different brands of Catholicism, may prevent any straightforward differences from emerging (Kehoe, 1998). Still, if

Protestant–Catholic differences emerge despite expected heterogeneity within the two groups, then this would perhaps provide more impressive support for the research hypotheses.

STUDY 1

In Study 1 I tested the two hypotheses using four large samples of undergraduates at the University of Missouri. Participants were first asked about their religious affiliation. Those who indicated that they were Protestant or Catholic were administered the 12-item Christian Religious Internalization Scale (CRIS; Ryan, Rigby, & King, 1993), which assesses both religious introjection and religious identification. Again, I hypothesized that self-designated Catholics would indicate greater introjection and lesser identification. As a second way of addressing the study issues, participants were presented with a single-item measure of the strength of religious identity. Consistent with the identification hypothesis, I expected that Catholic participants would evidence somewhat weaker religious identity.

In addition, measures of psychological well-being were administered to the four samples (Diener & Lucas, 1999). Do Catholics and Protestants differ in their rated life-satisfaction, happiness, and self-esteem? If such differences emerge it might be possible to explain them in terms of the expected differences in religious motivation. On the other hand, if no well-being differences emerge, this would suggest that Catholics experience rewards and satisfactions in their lives that counteract their motivational difficulties.

Methods

Participants and Procedures

Study participants were 2670 introductory psychology students at the University of Missouri who took the psychology department's "mass pretest" at the beginning of Winter semester 2001 (Sample 1; $N = 506$), Winter semester 2002 (Sample 2; $N = 631$), Winter semester 2003 (Sample 3; $N = 615$), and Fall semester 2001 (Sample 4; $N = 918$). During the first three weeks of the semester each of their classes was visited by trained research assistants who administered the survey. Although pretest takers did not receive direct experimental credit for their participation, they became eligible for multiple future experiments via their participation. The sample of 2670 students (1261 Protestant and 1409 Catholic) represented 49% of the total number of students who took the four pretests.

Measures

Religious affiliation. All participants were asked "What is your religious denomination or preference?" The response options were "Protestant," "Catholic," "Jewish," "Muslim," or "Not religious." The percentages of Jewish and Muslim respondents were very small within the total sample, and these participants are ignored henceforth, as well as those who answered "not religious."

Religious motivation. Later in the survey, participants read "If you said that your religious affiliation is "Protestant" or "Catholic" earlier, please answer the next twelve questions." The 12 questions were the CRIS (Ryan et al., 1993), which assesses both introjection ("I turn to God because I'd feel guilty if I didn't") and identification ("I share my faith because God is important to me and I'd like others to know Him, too"). Response options ranged from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*), and separate subscale scores were computed for each construct (see Ryan et al., 1993, for further information). In addition, to directly assess religious identity, participants were presented with the single item: "How important to you is your identification with your religious orientation?" The response options ranged from 1 (*not at all important*) to 3 (*somewhat important*) to 5 (*very important*).

Subjective well-being. In all four of the samples, the 5-item Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) was administered. This scale assesses the important cognitive component of subjective well-being (Diener, 1994; Diener & Lucas, 1999), and contains items such as "I am satisfied with my life" and "the conditions of my life are excellent." A 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) scale was used in all four samples. In two of the samples the Subjective Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky & Lepper, 1999) was administered. This scale directly assesses participants' sense of being a happy person, and contains items such as "In my life right now, I consider myself …," followed by the response options of 1 (*not a very happy person*) to 5 (*a very happy person*). Finally, in one sample the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965) was administered. This frequently used scale contains items such as "I take a positive attitude towards myself" and "I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others." A 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 4 (*strongly agree*) scale was employed.

Results

I first conducted principal components analyses of the 12 CRIS items within each of the four samples, to confirm the expected two-factor structure. Clean introjection and identification factors indeed emerged in each sample (total variance accounted for by the two factors ranged from 58 % to 63 %; after rotation, primary loadings ranged from .59 to .90, with no cross-loadings greater than .33). In

addition, the eight reliability coefficients ranged between .78 and .93 across the four samples. Internal consistencies were also good for the well-being scales (all reliabilities above .78).

Table 1 contains the means for the two motivation variables, split by sample and by religious affiliation. As hypothesized, strong and consistent differences emerged in all four samples for the identified motivation scale and for the religious identity item: Catholics reported lower levels of these two constructs. The pattern was less consistent for introjected motivation. Although Catholics evidenced significantly more introjection in one sample and marginally more introjection in another sample, these differences were smaller and were nonsignificant in two of the samples.

Table 1 also contains information concerning the well-being scales (life-satisfaction, happiness, and self-esteem). As can be seen, there were no significant differences on any of these scales.

Finally, I reconducted the analyses using the aggregated sample of 2670 to derive the most reliable conclusions. In this analysis Catholics were higher than Protestants in introjected motivation (Ms = 2.15 vs. 2.05, $p < .02$), lower than Protestants in identified motivation (Ms = 3.35 vs. 3.78, $p < .01$), and lower than Protestants in religious identity (Ms = 3.41 vs. 3.78, $p < .01$). There were no significant differences in life-satisfaction or happiness.

Brief Discussion

Study 1 provided support for my two basic hypotheses: Catholics were found to be substantially lower in identification and religious identity, and somewhat higher in introjection, compared to Protestants. Nevertheless, there were no differences be-

TABLE 1
Study 1: Protestant/Catholic Differences on Religious Motivation, Religious Identity, and Well-Being, Split by Sample

	Sample 1		*Sample 2*		*Sample 3*		*Sample 4*	
	Prots	*Caths*	*Prots*	*Caths*	*Prots*	*Caths*	*Prots*	*Caths*
Motivation Variables								
Introjection	1.96	2.06	2.08	2.15	2.06	2.16+	2.07	2.18*
Identification	3.84	3.41**	3.81	3.34**	3.64	3.23**	3.82	3.39**
Religious Identity	3.92	3.41**	3.71	3.35**	3.74	3.38**	3.78	3.35**
Well-Being Variables								
Life-Satisfaction	3.60	3.51	3.64	3.58	3.51	3.45	3.63	3.66
Happiness	–	–	3.65	3.63	–	–	3.30	3.32
Self-Esteem	–	–	–	–	3.80	3.72	–	–

Note. For each pair of means. + = they differ at $p < .10$, * = $p < .05$, ** = $p < .01$

tween the two groups on any of the well-being measures, despite the large power available for detecting even small differences. The absence of well-being effects suggests that Catholics do not necessarily suffer from their religious motivations. Of course, religiosity is just one of many factors that influence peoples' overall well-being (Diener & Lucas, 1999), and it appears that Catholics manage to compensate for their problematic religious motivation in other ways.

STUDY 2

A limitation of Study 1 was that it addressed only college students, who self-identified as Protestants or Catholics via a single survey item. We do not know how many of these students actually attend church, or participate actively in their purported faith. Also, we do not know if the results generalize to adults of other ages—perhaps they only apply to these students who have recently left their parents' households and who have not yet established their own religious identities. Thus, Study 2 employed a community sampling procedure, of adults of varying ages who are active participants within local religious congregations. Three samples were collected in Columbia, Missouri: one Catholic sample, one Baptist sample, and one Unitarian sample. This allowed me to contrast a Catholic group with both a mainstream Protestant group and a liberal Protestant group, which represent three presumably quite different positions on a continuum of institutional autonomy-supportiveness.

Furthermore, Study 2 included an expanded set of measures. Rather than employing the CRIS, which assesses only introjection and identification, I employed a set of items to address all four of the motives identified by SDT: external, introjected, identified, and intrinsic. This allowed me to test whether Catholics are also higher in the second noninternalized form of motivation identified by SDT, namely, external motivation.

In addition, I directly assessed the three basic psychological needs specified by SDT, namely, autonomy, competence, and relatedness, with reference to the church context (Deci & Ryan, 1991, 2000). These three needs are said to be universally important qualities of experience that independently predict thriving and personal growth in all cultures (Sheldon, Elliot, Kasser, & Kim, 2001). Including these measures allowed me to test whether Catholics experience less autonomy need-satisfaction in church, as suggested by the Study 1 results. Finding differences on autonomy need-satisfaction, but not competence and relatedness need-satisfaction, would further suggest that felt autonomy is a particular problem for Catholics.

Finally, I again administered the Satisfaction with Life scale, to again examine whether adherents to these differing religious traditions differ on this important component of subjective well-being. I also administered measures of positive af-

fect and negative affect, to examine whether participants differ on the other two major components of subjective well-being (Diener, 1994; Diener & Lucas, 1999).

I hypothesized that the Catholic sample would be higher than the other two samples on introjected motivation, and lower on identified motivation, replicating the Study 1 results. In addition, I hypothesized that Catholics would be higher in external motivation and lower in autonomy need-satisfaction than the other two samples. Based on the Study 1 findings, no differences were expected on the subjective well-being variables. I also expected no differences on competence or relatedness need-satisfaction.

Methods

Participants and Procedure

Leaders of the three congregations were contacted by phone or e-mail during early 2003. These leaders agreed to allow a research assistant to attend a regular church service, and to hand out surveys afterward. All surveys were anonymous, and completed surveys were returned during the subsequent 3 weeks. The final sample consisted of 40 Catholic participants, 30 Baptist participants, and 45 Unitarian participants.

Measures

Demographics. Participants were first asked to indicate their gender, their age, their ethnicity (African American, Caucasian, Asian, Latino, or Other), their marital status (Married, Divorced, Widow[er], Never Married), and their highest level of education (ranging from 1 [*Some high school*] to 6 [*Graduate degree*]). Although household income was assessed, these data were highly skewed and are thus ignored below (26 participants said they have "0" household income, probably misreading the question as asking about personal income).

Subjective well-being. Participants were next presented with the positive affect/ negative affect scale (PANAS; Watson, Tellegen, & Clark, 1988), which contains 10 positive emotion words (e.g., interested, proud, inspired) and 10 negative emotion words (e.g., ashamed, upset, afraid). They rated "how often you feel this way, in general, in your life" using a 1 (*rarely*) to 5 (*very often*) scale. Participants then completed the Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener et al., 1985; described in Study 1), using the same 5-point scale. Positive affect, negative affect, and life-satisfaction scores were computed from these ratings (alphas ranged from .88 to .92). In addition, an aggregate SWB score was computed by standardizing all three measures and subtracting negative affect from the sum of positive affect and life-satisfaction (see Diener, 1994; Sheldon & Elliot, 1999).

Religious motivation. Participants were then presented with four religious behaviors: "praying (or meditating)," "attending church," "donating to your church," and "reading the Bible." To assess religious motivation I adopted the assessment procedures of Sheldon and colleagues (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999; Sheldon & Kasser, 1998, 2001). Specifically, participants rated why they do each of the four behaviors, when they do it, in terms of four different reasons. The external motivation item was "because of the rewards (e.g., money, favors, or status) that it may provide down the road. For example, you might pray because it will help you to get to heaven." The introjected motivation item was "because you really ought to, even if you don't really want to. For example, you might pray because you would feel guilty or bad about yourself if you didn't." The identified motivation item was "because you really identify with it. For example, you might pray because you really feel it is the right thing to do, even if it is not always enjoyable." The intrinsic motivation item was "because of the enjoyment or stimulation that it provides you. For example, you might pray because it is interesting or enjoyable for you." All ratings were made using a 1 (*not at all for this reason*) to 5 (*very much for this reason*) scale. Separate external, introjected, identified, and intrinsic motivation scores were computed by averaging across the four behaviors (alphas ranged from .73 to .95).

Psychological need-satisfaction. To assess autonomy, competence, and relatedness need-satisfaction I adapted the 21-item Basic Psychological Needs scale (Deci, Ryan, Gagne, Leone, Usunov, & Kornazheva, 2003; Gagne, 2003). Participants read "Please read each of the following statements carefully, thinking about how it relates to your experience in church, and then indicate how true it is for you." Sample autonomy items are "I feel like I am free to decide for myself how to practice my religion" and "I feel pressured at church" (R). Sample competence items are "Most days I feel a sense of accomplishment from my religious activities" and "Often, I do not feel very competent in my religion" (R). Sample relatedness items are "I really like the people I interact with at church" and "I pretty much keep to myself and don't have a lot of social contacts at church" (R). The scale ranged from 1 (*Not at all true*) to 3 (*Somewhat true*) to 5 (*Very true*). Separate autonomy, competence, and relatedness need- satisfaction scores were computed after appropriate recoding (alphas = .62, .44 and .85, respectively. Although the competence satisfaction alpha was unusually low in this context, I retained it because it was not the focus of hypotheses).

Results

I first examined subsample differences on the demographic variables of age, sex, marital status (yes or no), and education. There were no differences between the three groups on the number of men versus women. However, significant omnibus differences emerged for age, income, and marital status ($ps < .01$). The Baptist

sample was somewhat older (mean age = 63.03, vs. 52.79 for Catholics and 53.04 for Unitarians) and more likely to be married (87 % married, vs. 58 % married for Catholics and Unitarians), and the Unitarian sample was somewhat more educated (mean = 5.33, vs. 4.93 for Baptists and 4.34 for Catholics). In the primary hypothesis tests I control for these differences.

Table 2 contains the means on the motivation, need-satisfaction, and well-being variables, split by sample. To evaluate the differences I conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) for each outcome variable in which sample (Catholic, Baptist, or Unitarian) was specified as a between-subjects factor and marital status, age, and education were simultaneous covariates. Omnibus effects are presented in the rightmost column, and the subscripts in the table denote the pair-wise differences that were significant at the .01 level or more.

The motivation variable analyses revealed an intriguing set of effects. As hypothesized, there was an omnibus difference on external motivation. Subsequent paired contrasts indicated that Catholics were significantly higher than both of the other two groups on this measure. Also as hypothesized, there was an omnibus difference on introjected motivation, with both Catholics and Baptists scoring higher than Unitarians on this measure. In addition there was an omnibus effect for identified motivation, as predicted. However, the direction of the means was unexpected, as Catholics were equal to the Baptists and were significantly higher than Unitarians on identification. Finally, there were no group differences on intrinsic motivation.

TABLE 2
Study 2: Mean Differences Between Catholics, Baptists, and Unitarians on Motivation, Need-Satisfaction, and Well-Being Variables

	Church Group			
	Catholics	*Baptists*	*Unitarians*	*Omnibus p*
Motivation				
External	2.07_{a}	1.23_{b}	1.28_{b}	< .01
Introjected	1.80_{a}	1.64_{a}	1.32_{b}	< .02
Identified	3.41_{a}	3.28_{ab}	2.77_{b}	< .01
Intrinsic	3.47_{a}	3.64_{a}	3.46_{a}	> .75
Need-Satisfaction				
Autonomy Satisfaction	4.10_{a}	4.34_{a}	4.56_{b}	< .01
Relatedness Satisfaction	4.16_{a}	4.40_{a}	4.31_{a}	> .20
Competence Satisfaction	3.47_{a}	3.63_{a}	3.67_{a}	> .12
Well-Being				
Life-Satisfaction	3.38_{a}	3.88_{a}	3.57_{a}	< .10
Positive Affect	3.72_{a}	3.75_{a}	3.67_{a}	> .90
Negative Affect	1.78_{ab}	1.52_{a}	2.01_{b}	< .01
Aggregate SWB	$-.18_{a}$	$.77_{b}$	$-.44_{ab}$	=.053

Note. Means not sharing subscripts differ at the .01 level or greater.

Turning to the need-satisfaction variables: as hypothesized, there was an omnibus difference in autonomy need-satisfaction. The Catholic group was lowest on autonomy satisfaction, although the difference was significant only for the comparison with the Unitarians. As expected, there were neither omnibus nor pair-wise differences for relatedness or competence satisfaction.

Turning to the well-being variables: Also as expected, there were no omnibus differences between the three groups on life-satisfaction or positive affect. However, there was a significant omnibus difference for negative affect. Pair-wise comparisons demonstrated that this was driven by the significant difference between Baptists and Unitarians (Unitarians reported more negative affect). Similarly, there was a significant omnibus difference for aggregate SWB, derived by combining the three well-being variables. Pair-wise comparisons demonstrated that this was driven by the significant difference between Catholics and Baptists.

Brief Discussion

Study 2 provided further support for the study hypotheses. Consistent with Study 1, Catholics tended to be higher in introjected motivation. Going beyond Study 1, Catholics were also significantly higher in external motivation, the other noninternalized form of motivation specified by SDT. Also going beyond Study 1, the Catholic group tended to be lower in felt autonomy need-satisfaction. Consistent with Study 1 there were no differences between the three groups on life-satisfaction, and new to Study 2, there were no differences on positive affect. Notably, unpredicted omnibus differences emerged for negative affect and for aggregate SWB. However these effects were primarily due to differences between the Baptists and the Unitarians, with the Catholics falling in the middle.

The most intriguing finding of Study 2 involved identified motivation. Whereas Catholic students in Study 1 were significantly lower in identified motivation compared to Protestant students, in Study 2 the Catholic churchgoers were higher in identified motivation than the Unitarian churchgoers, and equal to the Baptist churchgoers. This suggests that adult churchgoing Catholics have succeeded in internalizing their faith, despite their relatively high amounts of external and introjected motivation.

It is useful to briefly summarize the motivation findings by comparing the three groups. Catholics and Baptists manifested more introjected *and* more identified motivation than the Unitarians. Thus, it appears that the more traditional denominations evince more internalized motivation, of both positive (identification) and problematic (introjection) types. Furthermore, Catholics and Baptists evidenced less autonomy need-satisfaction compared to Unitarians, perhaps reflecting the more laissez-faire approach of Unitarian theology. Catholics and Baptists were distinguished from each other primarily by the higher levels of external motivation evidenced by the Catholics, and the lower levels of aggregate SWB.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

This study is one of the first to comparatively examine the motivations of different religious groups (but see Ryan et al., 1993). This focus allowed me to evaluate the Catholic guilt stereotype. Are Catholics "driven by guilt" in their religious practices?

The most accurate answer is "no." As demonstrated in Tables 1 and 2, introjected motivation was relatively low in all groups, compared to identified and intrinsic motivations. Thus, the differences being reported here are merely relative, across the low levels of introjection in all groups. Still, fairly consistent group differences emerged. In the large aggregate sample of Study 1 the Catholics were somewhat higher than the Protestants in introjection, and in Study 2, Catholics were higher than Unitarians (although not Baptists) in introjection. Thus, it appears that there may be something, at least, to the stereotype. In addition, Catholics were relatively higher than both Baptists and Unitarians in external motivation in Study 2; that is, the tendency to practice one's religion for the tangible rewards and payoffs that it might bring. Together, these findings suggest that Catholics have less internalized motivation, in general. In the language of SDT, they appear to feel somewhat "controlled" in their religious behavior.

Notably, however, in Study 2 the groups did not differ in intrinsic motivation, that is, the tendency to practice one's religion because of the inherent interest and enjoyment of doing so. Thus, it appears that the noninternalized motivations of Catholics do not necessarily undermine the experiential rewards that are available from their practices. This is somewhat surprising, as external and introjected motivations typically correlate negatively with intrinsic motivation (Ryan & Connell, 1989). Of course, patterns of group mean differences should not necessarily be expected to mirror patterns of correlations.

Somewhat mixed results emerged concerning identified religious motivation, which is the tendency to practice one's religion because one personally identifies with its values and tenets. In Study 1, Catholics were much lower in this motivation than Protestants. However, in Study 2, Catholics were equal to Baptists and higher than Unitarians in this motivation. This discrepancy may reflect the fact that the Study 1 participants were all college students, who may not actually practice their purported religion. In particular, the Study 1 sample may have contained more merely nominal, ambivalent, or "soon-to-be-lapsed" young Catholics (as evidenced by the fact that Catholics in that study were much lower on "religious identity").

Still, even if this is the case, it raises the question of why young Protestants would be less "nominal" in their self-proclaimed religious affiliations. One possible answer is found in the group differences in autonomy need-satisfaction observed in Study 2. Considering the items in the autonomy satisfaction scale (i.e., "I feel like I am (not) free to decide for myself how to practice my religion" and "I

feel pressured at church"), and the common truism that Catholic moral structures are more rigid, hierarchical, and guilt-based, it is possible to understand why college-age Catholics, who have recently left home, might feel considerable ambivalence about continuing in their religion.

It is useful to briefly compare the current conception of religious motivation, based in SDT, with past conceptions. Allport and Ross (1967) also discussed intrinsic and extrinsic forms of religions motivation, creating well-known scales to measure these two different religious orientations. However, their scales may lack measurement cohesiveness (Kirkpatrick, 1989). Furthermore, some of the Allport intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity items address other issues besides motivation, including dogmatism and orthodoxy, commitment and future intentions, and social relations and social models (Ryan et al., 1993). Thus, although these two scales correlated positively with the CRIS identification and introjection scales, respectively (Ryan et al., 1993), Ryan and colleagues argued that the CRIS more cleanly taps the constructs of interest, a contention that was supported by their data. Here, I suggest that the four-fold religious motivation measure introduced in Study 2 may provide the most differentiated conceptual and assessment tool to date.

Another potentially similar conception of religious motivation is provided by Batson and Ventis's (1982) distinction between three types of religious orientations: religion as a means, as an end, or as a quest. The Means scale maps roughly onto Allport's extrinsic orientation and SDT's external and introjected motivations, and the End scale maps roughly on Allport's intrinsic orientation and SDT's identified and intrinsic motivations. In contrast, the Quest scale purports to measure people's mature willingness to question and sometimes revise their own religious beliefs, which Batson and Ventis argued was missing from the Allport intrinsic orientation scale. Supporting the claim that the quest orientation measures something different than intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity, Ryan et al. (1993) showed in three studies that quest orientation was correlated with neither the Allport and Ross scales nor with the Ryan et al. scales. Thus, it remains for future research to better understand the differential effects of identified motivation (autonomy) versus ideological flexibility (quest).

Limitations of this research include the fact that all participants came from the Midwest United States, the fact that sample sizes were fairly small in Study 2, and the fact that only one Catholic and two Protestant congregations were sampled in Study 2. Future research might include students in other parts of the country and the world, might recruit larger samples within the congregations studied, and might sample more and different congregations of both Catholic and Protestant types. Such procedures would mitigate against the inherent dangers of making generalizations about groups as large and diverse as "Protestants" and "Catholics" based on just a few particular exemplars of these faiths. Finally, future research might also attempt to study religious involvement over time, and across the lifespan. Do young Catholics really have a more difficult time internalizing their reli-

gion, perhaps because of its more authoritarian nature? This interesting question awaits empirical investigation.

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